
# Creating a Cooperative Future


Steve Omohundro, Ph.D. Self-Aware Systems

## Will new technologies lead to greater: Conflict or Cooperation?

## Popular Media







## Utopia



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Tetrastichon vernacula Vtopiensium lingua.

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SOETSETSO · ODOVVO · LOOSTIO Horum verfaum ud verbum hae eft fententia,

Vtopus me dux exnon infula fecit infulam Vna ego terrarum omnium abfer philotophia Ciuiratem philotophicam expressi mortalibus Labéter impartio mea, no granatim accipio meliora,

## Assumptions About the Future

- More <u>intelligent</u> and <u>powerful</u> entities
- Complex ecosystem of humans, AIs, and hybrids
- Some designed to be <u>cooperative</u>, some not

### Want social contracts that:

- 1. Are <u>enforced</u> by participants
- 2. Are <u>stable</u> against: malicious entities, accidental runaway, collusion, deception
- 3. Preserve <u>cooperative human values</u> (eg. human rights, property rights)

- 1. Social Contracts
- 2.Co-opetition
- 3.AI Cooperation
- 4. Biological Cooperation
- 5.Origin of Human Values
- 6. Cooperative Future Technologies

## Social Contract Example:


## Driving on the right

Coordination problem
2 natural solutions:
Drive on Right and Drive on Left
Fairly self-enforcing and self-stabilizing

Requires collusion to switch eg. Sweden, September 3, 1967 at 4:50 AM










## Co-opetition




Game theoretic analysis of:

Cooperation in creating value Competition in dividing it up

- A revolutionary mindset that combines competition and cooperation.
- 2. The Game Theory strategy that's changing the game of business.


ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER
HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL
AND BARRY J. NALEBUFF



## Co-opetition Examples







Compete: For share of the profit





Cooperate: Expand use of Intel Architecture

Compete: Market share





Compete: For customers, gates, landing slots.
Cooperate: Frequent flier programs lock in customers so they both can raise prices.
Defraying Boeing's plane development costs.





Compete: For use of gazelle's meat Cooperate: Avoiding useless chases

## 3 Sources of Cooperation



Synergy
Win-Win interactions



Avoiding Dysergy
Lose-Lose interactions



Compassion
One or both care about the other

## 3 Sources of Synergy



### **Economies of Scale**

eg. bird flocks for food finding and predator detection and protection



### Complementary Needs

eg. Cleaner fish want food and hammerheads want clean skin



### **Complementary Abilities**

eg. In lichen, fungus provides water and support, algae provide photosynthesis

## Intelligent Systems

...act to achieve goals.

Whether they are built from:


- Neural Nets
- Productions Systems
- Theorem Provers
- Genetic algorithms
- ....



## Als will want to self-Improve


 Self-modification affects their entire future

- Must be very careful
- But very valuable




## Als will want to be rational

- Future self-modification needs clear goals
- Build an accurate model of the world
- Choose actions to meet goals
- Update world model based on what happens



## A Lone Superintelligence

- Efficient energy use
- Spatially compact
- Low energy computation
- Efficient physical change
- Efficient heat dissipation



## Competing Superintelligences

- •Game theoretic physics
- •Form determined by both efficiency and conflict




## Offense vs. defense

- Does more matter and free energy win?
- Can 2 entities of different power coexist?
- Is built-in cooperation necessary?




## Conflict becomes informational

- Make your shape expensive to sense, store, and predict
- But cheap for you
- Asymmetry of computation – problems are easier to pose than solve
- Energy encryption



## Aumann's Theorem


- Finitely iterated prisoner's dilemma has a cooperative solution for agents with bounded rationality
- Use up their processing in signaling



## Mutually Assured Distraction



## Conflict is harmful to both sides



## Motivated to create a Rational Peace



## Biology



Competitive

"Survival of the Fittest"
"Selfish Genes"




### Cooperative


"Synergy"
Importance of the Group
"Multiple Levels of Selection"

## Synergy Gives Evolution a Direction

"A highly original tour of human history.... Immensely readable as well as immensely contentious." - The Wall Street Journal NONZERO THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY ROBERT WRIGHT

AUTHOR OF THE MORAL ANIMAL





### JOHN MAYNARD SMITH & EÖRS SZATHMÁRY


# THE MAJOR TRANSITIONS IN EVOLUTION



- Replicating molecules -> Compartments
- Independent replicators -> Chromosomes
- 3. RNA -> DNA + Protein
- 4. Prokaryotes -> Eukaryotes
- 5. Asexual clones -> Sexual populations
- 6. Protists -> Multicellular organisms
- 7. Solitary individuals -> Colonies
- 8. Primate societies -> Human language

## Each Level Needs Mechanisms to Create Cooperation Among Its Parts

Multicellular Organisms



Danger: Cancer

Solution: Immune System

**Human Society** 



Danger: Criminals

Solution: Police and Courts

### Rational Economic Behavior

Universal optimal intelligence algorithm to achieve well-defined goals:

- Simulate each possible action
- Choose the action most likely to reach the goal
- Update the world model based on what actually happens



### Formally:

Preferences: *utility function U(h)* 

Beliefs: *subjective probability P(h)* 

Act to maximize expected utility

Act to maximize expected utility
Update P using Bayes' theorem: 
$$P(h \mid d) = \frac{P(d \mid h) \cdot P(h)}{\sum_{h} P(d \mid h) \cdot P(h)}$$

## Fully Rational Behavior is too expensive

- Samuel's checker program
- Truncate deliberative search and use a learned model
- Simplify the state space
- Limit is reinforcement learning TD-lambda or Q learning (state s, reward r, discount g, new state s'):
- V(s) < -V(s) + a(r+gV(s')-V(s))




## Approximate Rational Behavior

- 1. A source of diversity
- 2. A selection mechanism
- 3. An updating mechanism

### Strengthen successful paths.

(evolution, development, ecosystems, economies, bee hives and ant hills, immune systems, brains, animal physiology, cell physiology)



### Evolution

State: Distribution of genes in the gene pool.

### **Adaptive**

### <u>Simple</u>

- 1. Random mutation
- Natural selection
- 3. Differential reproduction


#### Directed mutation:


*Induced global mutation:* bacteria


Local hypermutation: Haemophilus Influenzae


*Induced local mutation*: E. Coli

Induced regional mutation: Brassica nigra









#### Smarter selection:

Baldwin effect: downloading learning
Deliberative Baldwin effect
Sexual selection
Interactions with development

#### **Smarter updating:**


Meta-evolution – evolving to evolve Epigenetic change

## Development

State is number and location of different cell types.

### <u>Simple</u>


C. Elegans: 959 cells



### **Adaptive**

Plasticity 3x Dieback







## Immune Systems

State is distribution of immune cells.

Simple Invertebrates **Innate Immunity** phagocytic amebocytes

Adaptive Vertebrates
Innate and Adaptive Immunity Successful antibodies reproduce





### **Brains**

State is neural activity.

### <u>Simple</u>

No deliberation Rigid memory Rigid learning if any Situation/Action Rules


### **Adaptive**

Deliberation Memory Learning

Hebb rule: strengthen successful activity







## Physiology


### <u>Simple</u>


E. Coli Gene Regulation Networks

### **Adaptive**

Human Physiology Hormone networks

#### Strengthen muscle and bone that gets used





## The Beehive as Organism

Individual bees can't survive
Beehive is "warm blooded":
Bees shiver if too cold
Spread water if too warm
Castes are like organs
Queen is like ovaries
Bee type is like cell type
Decision making on response
Hive cognition
Reproduction like mitosis
Dance like neural firing



## Groups and Individuals

- Individual preferences + social contract give rise to group preferences
- Stable social contracts include enforcement mechanisms
- So group preferences shape individual preferences
- Evolutionary pressure to fit in
- Only partial incorporation of group mind
- Interests are not necessarily aligned (eg. cooperation)
- There exist social contracts that go against every member's preferences

## SUPER-ORGANISM

The Beauty, Elegance, and Strangeness of Insect Societies



Bert Hölldobler AND E.O. Wilson

WINNERS OF THE PULITZER PRIZE FOR THE ANTS

### Group vs. Individual Conflicts

- Tragedy of the commons eg. overfishing
- Externalities eg. pollution
- Proliferation eg. cancer, population control
- Equality eg. income disparity
- Damage due to competition eg. war, fighting
- Signalling costs eg. conspicuous consumption

### Group cooperation mechanisms

- Immune system eg. cancer
- Police system eg. property rights
- Legal system eg. contracts
- Mutually Assured Destruction eg. nuclear detente
- Moral code eg. murder
- Social stigma eg. sociopathic behavior
- Social rewards eg. heroes
- Altruism eg. rescuing strangers
- Membership eg. in families, churches, countries


### Bee mind vs. Hive mind





# Humans: Ego and Social Mind



### Haidt: 5 Moral Emotions








Non-harming Fairness

Non-harming
Fairness
Loyalty
Respect for authority
Purity or sanctity

# Seven Deadly Sins





# Ghandi's Updated Seven Sins



### 1971 Kohlberg: 6 stages of morality


- Avoiding punishment
- 2. What's in it for me?
- 3. Being a good boy
- 4. Obeying the law
- Upholding the social contract
- Universal ethical principles
- 7. Transcendental morality?



#### Recent Human Moral Evolution

- Slavery
- Torture
- War crimes
- Women's rights
- Racial equality
- Animal rights
- Ecological movements
- Sustainability

• ...



### Must Choose the Rights We Want



### Social Contract Technology

- Mathematical proof
- Formal contracts and laws
- Provably least restrictive constraints
- Given desired properties generate constraints
- Stability properties
- Revealable source code and utility functions
- Provably limited systems
- Provably limited escrow agents
- Formal Provenance

### Monitoring

- Entities monitor each other
- Enforcement by groups of entities
- Must limit the maximum power of individuals
- Must prevent certain kinds of collusion
- Oblivious computing
- Provably limited monitoring: only what's specified
- Watching the watchers
- Punishing non-punishers

# Group Decision Making

- Beyond today's voting systems: Semantic aggregation
- Formal procedures for changing the social contract
- Formal meta-constraints for stability
- Group shared knowledge

### Roadmap from the Present

- We'll need AIs to design these systems
- But we must trust the design AIs!
- Computational hardware provably isolated from its software
- Provably limited manufacturing hardware
- Provably limited software
- Social trust networks
- Incentive design
- Safety monitoring networks

# Self-Aware Systems

Semantic Computing Initiative

Cooperative Technology Initiative

#### Create a Cooperative Future

